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Given the failure of system-level theories to account for the difference in the US 
actions towards Peru and Chile from 1968 to 1973, the research sought a state-level 
analysis. This thesis examined the conventional wisdom that the CIA is a regime change 
advocate by testing the merits of two competing state-level analysis constructs, one 
focused on internal (endogenous) influences within CIA and one focused on external 
(exogenous) pressures on CIA emanating from the American public and elected officials. 
Of the two hypotheses, public choice theory, which focused on the external 
pressure on the CIA, offers the most potential as an explanatory tool for CIA involvement 
in regime change. While cultural variables were identified in an examination of memoirs 
and government documents, there was no consistency across the two cases. Through 
analysis of external pressures, CIA efforts matched what the public’s, the president’s, and 
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This thesis examined the common idea that the CIA is a regime change advocate 
by testing the merits of two competing political science theories, one focused on internal 
(endogenous) influences within CIA and one focused on external (exogenous) pressures 
on CIA emanating from the American public and elected officials. This was 
accomplished through two case studies – one where the CIA conducted covert regime 
change operations and one where it did not. Of the two hypotheses, public choice theory, 
which focused on the external pressure on the CIA, offers the most potential as an 
explanatory tool for CIA involvement in regime change. While cultural variables were 
identified in an examination of memoirs and government documents, there was no 
consistency across the two cases. Through analysis of external pressures, CIA efforts 
matched what the public’s, the president’s, and Congress’s attention was focused on—
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The US has a long history of pursuing regime change in an attempt to create 
conditions favorable to US interests. Since its creation in 1947, the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) has been the most consistent tool of choice when these efforts have been 
covert. Despite the international ire this method provokes, the US has continued to pursue 
regime change as a viable policy option. While the most often cited cases of US attempts 
of regime change occurred during the Cold War, since its end in 1990, the US has 
conducted regime change operations in multiple countries, including Haiti, Afghanistan, 
Libya, Syria, and Iraq. Most recently, during Operation Timber Sycamore from 2013 to 
2017, the CIA armed and trained rebels in the Syrian civil war. Because of the continued 
relevance of regime change as a US policy option, it is important to understand the 
factors that contribute to ongoing policy support for this intensely controversial, and 
highly consequential, incursion of state sovereignty. 
In explaining US regime change policy in Latin America and elsewhere, both 
conventional wisdom and the bulk of scholarly literature examining CIA activity from the 
1950s–1970s condemn the CIA for carrying out regime changes that damaged the 
development of democracy and long-term stability for the country in question, and its 
relationship with the US. The CIA tends to be portrayed as a knee-jerk regime change 
advocate when US interests were threatened by governments sympathetic to the Soviet 
Union and its practices. Typical of this sentiment are the comments of Arthur 
Schlesinger, who served as special assistant and historian during President John F. 
Kennedy’s administration and reflected in 1994 about US actions in a regime change 





We misunderstood the whole struggle down there. He wasn’t a 
Communist. The British thought we were overreacting, and indeed we 
were. The C.I.A. decided this was some great menace, and they got the bit 
between their teeth. But even if British Guiana had gone Communist, it’s 
hard to see how it would be a threat. (Weiner 1994) 
 
It is important to note that the CIA does not have full autonomy over its 
operations due to presidential oversight (Roberts 2009). Indeed, the decision to conduct a 
covert operation is the responsibility of the president; at the same time the CIA is often 
the scapegoat and occupies a peculiar place in the policy-making process as one who 
informs the decision and then carries out the decision. “Although covert actions represent 
a very small fraction of the Agency’s entire budget, these operations have at times been 
controversial and over time have dominated the public’s perception of the CIA” (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004, 86). The CIA and regime 
change are irrefutably linked in the minds of the public, academia, and the government, 
and few scholars focus on a critical examination of that link, analyzing what part the 
president and the CIA each play. Books such as Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of 
the CIA, Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions since WWII, US Presidents 
and Latin American Interventions: Pursuing Regime Change in the Cold War, Covert 
Regime Change, and CIA and the Third World and journal articles including “What 
Really Happened in Chile: The CIA, the Coup Against Allende, and the Rise of 
Pinochet,” “Interfering with civil society: CIA and KGB covert political action during the 
Cold War,” and the “CIA’s Holy War” alternate between a near exclusive focus on the 
CIA or the president without attention to the interplay between them and their respective 





The overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954 and of Mohammad 
Mossadeq in Iran in 1953 are often considered the beginning of the link between the CIA 
and its use as a policy tool to carry out regime change operations. Speaking on 
Guatemala, one scholar states,  
In method, scale, and conception it had no antecedent, and its triumph 
confirmed the belief of many in the Eisenhower administration that covert 
operations offered a safe, inexpensive substitute for armed force in 
resisting Communist inroads in the Third World. (Cullather 2006, 7) 
 
It wasn’t just the political administration that thought the events in Guatemala and Iran 
were noteworthy, however. Shortly after the events of both operations, the CIA itself 
leaked details to journalists Richard and Gladys Harkness (Prados 2006, 122). In 
response, Richard Harkness wrote a letter to Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Allen 
Dulles stating, “We sifted into the manuscript your suggestions for giving the story a 
constructive quality by pointing out the Red gains through subversion, and the fact that 
CIA is the agency to combat those tactics” (13 August 1954, Allen W. Dulles Papers). As 
one scholar noted, this correspondence suggests that “Dulles actively sought publicity for 
covert action, presumably to build support in Congress for the agency’s budget as well as 
to augment its reputation for invincibility and cleverness” (Zirinsky 1995, 361). Figures 
both within and outside of the CIA attributed ownership of regime change operations to 
the Agency. Success in Guatemala and Iran helped to set up a path for covert operations 
to continue being a favored method by presidential administrations and the CIA to 
combat communism throughout the next few decades. The most comprehensive database 
of US-backed regime change attempts during the Cold War (1947–1989) includes 64 





This thesis proposes a first step in testing the widely held assertion that 
institutional support for regime change within the CIA was a determining factor in the US 
pursuit of regime change during the Cold War era. To be clear, this research is not 
intended to discuss the ethics of US intervention in the affairs of foreign countries nor to 
what extent the actions of the CIA are responsible for the consequent outcome of regime 
change in foreign countries. Instead, it is a first step in assessing whether exogenous or 
endogenous factors played a greater role in shaping CIA involvement in regime change 
operations. The contribution this thesis makes toward that goal is to compare the impact 
of the endogenous factor of CIA organizational culture as it pertains to institutional 
decision-making on regime change policy against the exogenous factors examined 
through public choice theory as it pertains to bureaucratic behavior. 
With this objective in mind, operations of the CIA in South America reveal an 
interesting puzzle. The US, through the CIA, attempted to influence Chile’s 1964 and 
1970 presidential elections and then supported a coup in Chile in 1973 in order to counter 
the leftist policies of President Salvador Allende. In contrast, the CIA chose not to pursue 
any type of regime change in Peru after a coup in 1968 put a leftist government in place. 
This is despite evidence of Soviet support for the new Peruvian government through arms 
sales, nationalization of the US-owned International Petroleum Company, and other 
policies potentially harmful to the US. 
What are the possible explanations for the divergence in US decision-making 
regarding the utility of regime change? Two dominant system-level theories, realism and 
liberal institutionalism, fail to adequately account for this puzzle. Realism argues that a 





conditions were met. First, if regime change would diminish the sphere of influence of 
the US’s key competitor during the Cold War, the Soviet Union, and could be 
accomplished with minimal harm to US interests then the US would intervene. Further, 
for hegemonic balance of power, the US would be led to intervene if its dominant role in 
the Western Hemisphere was threatened. O’Rourke uses realism to explain covert regime 
change: “In the context of the Cold War this meant that the United States tried to prevent 
left-wing regimes from assuming power out of fear that they would spark a series of 
defections from the American-led regional order” (O’Rourke 2018, 13–14, 41). Second, 
if regime change would advance US economic interests by either protecting existing 
interests or advancing new ones and therefore expand its economic power base, again 
with minimal harm to US interests, then realism argues that the US would pursue regime 
change. The cases of Peru and Chile appear to meet one or both of these criteria, and 
therefore, according to the rational pursuit of power as outlined by realism, the US would 
be expected to pursue regime change in both cases.  
Another key theory, liberal institutionalism, argues that institutions alongside 
nation-states play a critical role on the world stage and shape the decision-making of key 
nation-states. Both the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations 
(UN) existed at the time the US pursued regime change in Chile, and both organizations 
strongly opposed such action as unlawful (Charter of the OAS, Article 19 and “The 
Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation,” UN General Assembly, 1970). Thus, the institutions with relevant 





cannot stand as a sufficient explanation for the dependent variable—regime change in 
one case and not in the other.  
Given the failure of system-level theories to account for the difference in the 
dependent variable, this thesis seeks explanation at a more granular level: state-level 
analysis, specifically the role of key sub-national actors, in this case the role played by 
the CIA. If conventional wisdom is correct, the CIA, as a sub-state actor accounted for 
within state-level analysis, is culpable as a key influencer in US national security 
decision-making as a proponent of regime change. This thesis will examine that premise 
by testing the merits of two competing state-level analysis constructs, one focused on 
internal (endogenous) influences within the CIA and one focused on external 
(exogenous) pressures on the CIA emanating from the American public and elected 
officials, in order to explain the divergence of action in question: the pursuit of regime 
change in Chile on the one hand and failure to pursue regime change in Peru on the other.  
Should the analysis of organizational culture provide a stronger explanation of the 
two approaches, this would provide a measure of evidence in favor of the popular 
contention that the CIA was culpable as a key influencer and advocate of regime change 
for US policy within the designated time frame. If instead this research determines that 
internal culture played a negligible role and that the CIA was responding to external 
pressures in the ways predicted by public choice theory – pursuing those activities that 
would enhance its organizational budget and grow the institution’s positive reputation in 
the eyes of its political masters—then the assumption that the CIA bore primary 
responsibility for determining when and why regime change took place needs to be 





American public and their elected representatives. In order to examine the merits of these 
competing explanatory paradigms, two competing hypotheses will be examined: 
Hypothesis A—founded in Organizational Culture: Pronounced cultural attributes 
internal to the CIA contributed significantly to CIA thinking and decision-making 
regarding regime change and tipped the scales in favor of regime change in the case of 
Chile and against regime change in Peru. 
Hypothesis B—founded in Public Choice Theory: Exogenous pressures from the 
American public and American elected officials were the primary determinants in the 
focus of CIA attention, analysis, and action in the case of pursuing regime change in 
Chile and inaction in Peru.  
In what follows, I first review the theories often used to analyze the motivations 
and events leading up to foreign intervention with an aim of regime change and 
demonstrate that they do not sufficiently explain the contrast in US actions towards Chile 
and Peru. Second, I examine the existing literature on strategic culture, the CIA’s culture, 
and public choice theory—the foundations of my two competing hypotheses. Third, I 
propose my argument, hypothesis, and observable implications, along with the 
methodology I will use. I will use process tracing within the two case studies of Peru and 











REALISM AND NEOREALISM 
Realism was long the dominant method for explaining international relations. 
Kenneth Waltz is considered the founder of neorealism, or structural realism, where—
like realism—the unit of analysis is at the state level. Frequently summarized as centering 
on relative power shifts, these companion theories do not examine the differences 
between states, such as those between a democracy and an authoritarian regime. In his 
seminal book, Theory of International Relations, Waltz states the main belief about 
states’ actions: 
From the theory, one predicts that states will engage in balancing 
behavior, whether or not balanced power is the end of their acts. From the 
theory, one predicts a strong tendency toward balance in the system. The 
expectation is not that a balance, once achieved, will be maintained, but 
that a balance, once disrupted, will be restored in one way or another. 
(Waltz 1979, 128) 
 
Mearsheimer further expands neorealism and focuses on great power competitions. He 
argues that great powers are always seeking to gain power over their opponents and that 
relative, rather than absolute, power is key. He succinctly summarizes the five basic 
assumptions that neorealists use in their theories: the world is anarchic, meaning that 
there is no higher governing body for states; great powers possess offensive capabilities; 
states are never certain of other states’ intentions; survival is the primary goal; and states 
are rational actors (Mearsheimer 2001, 54–55). In essence, states’ behavior is the result of 
an anarchic system in which they each constantly struggle for power and security.  
During the time period studied, the US was caught up in the Cold War. This was a 





power—hegemonic, regional, perceived, and actual. A pattern emerged across the world, 
but particularly in Central and South America. If a country was perceived to be slanting 
communist, the US would intervene. Guatemala in 1954 was the first major effort, but 
Cuba, Chile, Panama, Haiti, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Brazil were all the focus of a regime 
change operation at some point during the Cold War. 
In Chile, Salvador Allende was elected in 1970 and began implementing many 
leftist policies. He considered nationalization of the copper industry as a crucial first step, 
due to the three US-based copper companies who were responsible for nearly 80% of the 
annual copper production (Grow 2008, 95). Allende had campaigned on an anti-
imperialist, anti-capitalist platform and proposed the construction of a socialist country 
(Grow 2008, 95). In addition to threatening American economic interests, Allende was 
viewed as a communist threat. Allende was the first democratically elected Marxist 
president. He renewed diplomatic relations with Cuba, and during a month-long visit 
Fidel Castro helped set up the Chilean internal security agency (Gustafson 2007, 172). 
Furthermore, Allende had ties to the Soviet Union, and trade between the two countries 
increased. “Soviet economic cooperation . . . included generous credits to promote Soviet 
exports, extensive purchases of the Latin American partner’s traditional exports, technical 
assistance, and gifts for humanitarian purposes” (Blasier 1987, 38). The hegemonic 
balance of power would shift in relative measure if Chile fell completely under the sphere 
of influence of the Soviet Union. Henry Kissinger stated in a meeting discussing Chile, “I 
don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the 





1970). Common thinking amongst US political and defense leaders was that Communism 
was an influence to be fought against in all instances.  
An attempt by the US at regime change in Chile fits within the assumption base of 
competitive state behavior posited by both realism and neorealism, yet the same set of 
theories fails to explain why there was no similar attempt at regime change in Peru after 
the 1968 coup. The only Latin American country other than Cuba to receive Soviet arms 
transfers was Peru, with the addition of almost one hundred Soviet military advisors in 
Peru and over 600 members of the Peruvian military training in the Soviet Union (Blasier 
1987, 43). The Velasco government “expropriated oil and other natural resources, 
imposed controls over foreign imports, introduced agrarian reform” and took an anti-
imperialist stance against the United States (Blasier 1987, 42). Peru followed a pattern 
similar to Chile’s, with anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist rhetoric from leaders and close 
ties with the Soviet Union. In fact, a New York Times article called the actions of the 
leftist military government in Peru “the most serious challenge to the United States in 
Latin American since the Cuban missile crisis” (Browne 1969). Using a realist/neorealist 
explanation, all of these factors signaled a possible shift in relative power globally 
between the US and Soviet Union and regionally within the Western Hemisphere and 
should have caused the US to take the same action as it did in Chile. However, the US did 
not attempt a regime change operation in Peru.  
 
NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM 
Another theory of international relations that possibly explains the events in Chile 
and Peru is neoliberal institutionalism. Similar to neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism 





makeup of the state—meaning type of government, such as authoritarian or democratic—
is important and that institutions are significant actors on the world stage as well. 
International institutions are used by states as a signaling mechanism and serve to 
enhance communication between states. They are used in the bargaining process and 
provide a way to avoid war. 
States choose to cooperate because they realize that they will have future 
interactions with the same actors. . . .Those repeated interactions provide 
the motivation for states to create international institutions, which in turn 
moderate state behavior, providing a guaranteed framework for 
interactions and a context for bargaining. (Mingst and Arreguín-Toft 2013, 
188) 
 
Under a neoliberal institutionalist view, institutions provide a channel for interstate 
negotiations and, importantly, constrain the actions of states.  
 Since its foundation, the United States has been and is currently still a part of a 
wide number of international organizations including the United Nations (UN) and the 
Organization of American States (OAS). Both institutions oppose covert operations or 
interference in the affairs of other member states. South America has long attempted to 
stop the United States’ meddling in the affairs of regional states and has worked toward 
international agreements such as conventions and treaties prohibiting it as early as the 
1800s. A major attempt was with the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of 
States in 1933. The US delegate to the convention submitted this statement for the record: 
“Every observing person must by this time thoroughly understand that under the 
Roosevelt Administration, the United States Government is as much opposed as any 
other government to interference with the freedom, the sovereignty, or other internal 
affairs or processes of the governments of other nations” (Convention on Rights and 





The 1948 charter of the OAS, of which the United States was a founding member, 
clearly stated that  
no State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, 
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other 
State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any 
other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the 
State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements. (Article 19) 
 
Despite signing the Montevideo Convention and the OAS charter, the US still covertly 
intervened in countries throughout South America. Additionally, in the late 1970s, after 
the events in Chile, the OAS passed a series of resolutions against covert regime change 
operations. Despite these efforts, the OAS had little enforcement power, and there was no 
noticeable effect on the United States as a result. Covert operations for regime change 
continued. At the same time there were ongoing regime change operations in Chile, the 
UN General Assembly, of which the US is a permanent member, passed “The 
Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation,” which states: 
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or 
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of 
any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of 
interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or 
against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of 
international law.  
 
No State may use or encourage the use of economic political or any other 
type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the 
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it 
advantages of any kind. Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, 
finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed 
towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere 
in civil strife in another State. (1970) 
 
Neoliberal institutionalism would argue that the disapproval of the UN and the 





constrained by international agreements and international norms, limiting US plans for 
regime change. Instead, the US might lean on institutions and other bargaining tools to 
signal its intentions in order to resolve the situation with both Chile and Peru. The strong 
institutional prohibitions and inhibitions against regime change would apply equally in 
both cases, which means that neoliberal institutionalism does not provide an adequate 
explanation for why the US refrained from regime change in Peru but not in Chile. 
 
STATE-LEVEL THEORIES: STRATEGIC CULTURE AND PUBLIC CHOICE 
THEORY 
Because system-level theories fail to adequately explain the divergence in US 
actions towards Chile and Peru, it is necessary to examine a wider reach of potential 
variables that could impact policy decisions. Peter J. Katzenstein concludes that 
realism/neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism share the same weakness—the focus 
on systemic effects and not the state-level motivations and other social concepts that 
inform policy (Katzenstein 1996, 13). These “motivations and other social concepts” are 
the potential variables that could help explain the divergence in US actions regarding 
Peru and Chile. In this thesis, I will take a closer look at the internal and external factors 
through strategic culture—the combined influence of national and organizational cultures 
on foreign and security policy—and public choice theory—the study of political choices 
using the tools of economists and the assumption that, like markets, politics exists in an 







The decision for the US to engage in covert operations to effect regime change in 
a foreign state is a policy choice. Within the strategic culture paradigm, the policy-
making process is defined as “elite agendas processed through national culture, the 
national policy process and organizational culture, married to material capabilities, and 
inhibited or advanced by external actors” (Johnson 2006, 28). Cultural variables are 
present at every step of this process.  
Culture shapes practice in both the short and long term. At the moment of 
action, culture provides the elements and grammar that define the 
situation, that reveal motives, and that set forth a strategy for success. If 
the strategy is successful, that strategy is repeated in similar situations 
with similar motives. The perception of similarity of situations and 
motives is a product of the culture. (Hudson 1997, 28)  
 
The national and organizational culture aspects of the policy-making process are 
the core focus of scholarship on strategic culture. Strategic culture is defined as the 
following: 
That set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior, derived 
from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), 
that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which 
determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives. 
(J. L. Johnson, Kartchner, and Larsen 2009, 9) 
 
Scholarship within this literature has focused on national-level cultures as well as 
organizational-level cultures to examine the impact on decision-making related to 
national security. Strategic culture scholars argue that no matter the goal of the elite 
decision makers’ policy choices—such as regime change—they are affected by national, 
public, bureaucratic, congressional, and organizational cultures. In the instance of regime 
change, strategic culture shapes the decisions at all levels in regards to covert operations 





 In Jeannie Johnson’s strategic culture work studying a single organizational 
culture—the US Marines—within the national culture of the US, she notes the 
importance of narrowing the focus to a singular issue and then narrowing the analysis to 
the actor most relevant to the policy issue (2018, 22). As noted in her work and that of 
other scholars, US strategic culture is composed of competing narratives and subcultures. 
The relationship between subcultures and then between the subcultures and the national 
culture is still an emerging area of study. I have chosen to narrow my focus to the single 
agency within the US most often cited as culpable for pursuing regime change as 
policy—the CIA. As the key agency which informs and then executes policy decisions 
regarding regime change, the CIA is uniquely positioned to impact regime change as a 
policy tool.  
A number of norms and values were raised by various authors in my review of 
relevant literature on the culture of the CIA, including the following: homogeneity of 
personnel, scientism, preference for secrets, drive for consensus, risk aversion, focus on 
production over quality, confirmation bias, maintenance of corporate judgement, and the 
selection and weighing of data based on classification (Jones and Silberzahn 2013; 
Marchetti and Marks 1974; Johnston 2005; Aid 2011; Cooper 2005; Zegart 2007). In 
assessing these, I narrowed the field of examination to four primary cultural traits 
mentioned with consistency across the literature and validated by respected scholars. As 
“pre-eminent” traits, we would expect these to surface within this thesis research as 
particularly impactful if endogenous factors weighed most heavily in CIA decision-





First, the CIA values secrecy. This is illustrated by giving more weight to 
classified data and the tendency to dismiss open-source intelligence. A former chairman 
of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) illustrated this point when he jokingly said, 
“At the NIC, we used to quip that if academics sometimes did better than intelligence 
analysts, it was because the former weren’t denied access to open sources!” (Treverton 
2003, 108). Analysts are on record as stating that they place more importance on data 
collected by covert means (Johnston 2005, 24). Former CIA director Robert Gates spoke 
of the importance of secrecy in his memoir. He attributes it to the influence of the 
Directorate of Operations, the department that ran covert operations: 
For them secrecy is not a convenience or a bureaucratic matter, but the 
essential tool of their craft—without it, sources are executed, operations 
fail, case officers’ careers are cut short, and sometimes they and their 
agents do die. Their culture, their ethic were the CIA’s in 1969. They ran 
the Agency bureaucratically. And few question the rightness of that. 
(Gates 1996, 33) 
 
Other studies also tie this focus on secrets and classified data back to the Cold War:  
Unfortunately, information for intelligence is still treated within the old 
“hierarchy of privilege” that emphasized “secrets” and was more 
appropriate for a bureaucratized superpower adversary who threatened us 
with large military forces and advanced weapons systems. (Cooper 2005, 
12) 
 
 Second, a higher priority is placed on intelligence operations rather than analysis. 
Dr. Rob Johnston is an ethnographer specializing in the cultural anthropology of work 
and who worked as a staff member at the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence. 
While he was there, he undertook a detailed ethnographic study of the intelligence 
community, and he found that 
the Intelligence Community, in its culture and mythos and in its literature, 
tends to focus on intelligence operations rather than on intelligence 





with time constraints and the analytic production cycle, the private and 
public focus on operations has had an effect on intelligence analysts and 
analytic methodology. (Johnston 2005, 17) 
 
Another study looked closely at the CIA and found that the operational support was 
considered one of the most important duties for analysts (Cooper 2005, 29). This has the 
effect of diminishing long-term strategic research and steers analysts towards reporting 
rather than analyzing. 
 Third, a greater emphasis is placed on the production of intelligence–how many 
pieces are produced and for whom–over quality. This is not to say that quality is ignored, 
but it is harder to measure quality and easier to count products. In addition, the 
intelligence work within the CIA is focused on responding to stakeholders and 
responding to requests for information from the administration. Value is placed on being 
able to quickly respond to current events and the daily production cycle, rather than long-
term analytics. Tying together both the focus on operational support and importance of 
secrets, analysts focus on “provable evidence,” often “at the cost of ignoring important 
inferential judgements” (Cooper 2005, 27). Analysts place more emphasis on evidence 
that is quantifiable or coming directly from the work of agents in the field. This means 
they often do not include any conclusions or generalizations that can be drawn from their 
work. In addition, promotions and performance evaluations are based on the number of 
daily products they produce and how influential senior policymakers judge their work to 
be (Johnston 2005, 16; Zegart 2007, 68). 
 Lastly, CIA culture cultivates a drive for consensus. There is a bias towards 
confirming earlier views and a tendency to look for data that will confirm prevailing 





CIA “taboo” due to the need to “avoid loss of status, trust, or respect” (Johnston 2005, 
23). When the CIA deems that the national security community and the president’s 
administration is unlikely to be open to a change in the official CIA position, then the 
CIA is not likely to include differing viewpoints. Jones and Silberzahn recount a story 
that a retired CIA officer related to them: 
In 1984, the chief of the Soviet Economy Division at the CIA had 
forcefully argued that the USSR would soon face a Hobson’s choice 
between “guns and butter.” The former analyst reported, however, “The 
problem here was that in 1984 the rest of the community—especially the 
DOD—was not willing to even entertain such an idea,” so the chief’s 
argument didn’t make it into CIA assessments. (Jones and Silberzahn 
2013, 48) 
 
In this case, the retired CIA officer had noted the national security community was not 
willing to accept the USSR was under significant strain, which would have departed from 
earlier analytic work. In CIA culture, analysts begin their efforts by using previous 
versions of official CIA work, and due to the taboo on changing official positions, they 
do not always question the core assumptions—an issue also referred to as confirmation 
bias (Cooper 2005). 
 Within the literature that examines the links between CIA culture, analyses, and 
operations, the focus is overwhelmingly on understanding strategic surprises or 
intelligence failures. When it comes to understanding the CIA and regime change, the 
literature has not yet attempted to examine the two facets in concert. The purpose of this 
research is to determine whether these cultural factors play a significant role in 
explaining the divergence in decision-making regarding US regime change policy in 






Public Choice Theory  
Instead of endogenous cultural factors shaping the response of the CIA, another 
potential explanation for the difference in US actions toward Chile and Peru lies in the 
motivations behind bureaucratic behavior caused by external pressures. Public choice 
theory is founded on the assumption that politics operates in an “environment of scarce 
resources and uncertainty,” with the political systems divided into four groups (Figure 
1)—bureaucrats, politicians, voters, and interest groups (Simmons 2011, 52). This 
environment creates several motivations for bureaucratic behavior, namely protecting an 
institution’s budget and maximizing its autonomy and power.  
Public choice theory in political science has its roots in the work of James 
Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, who took the basic assumptions that economists make 
about human behavior and applied them to an individual’s participation in the political 
process—an individual makes choices for utility-maximization (Buchanan and Tullock 
1962). Niskanen took this further with his work on how bureaucracies are motivated to 
maximize their budgets to ensure the survival of the agency, describing the interplay 
between bureaucrats and their sponsoring organization as “awkward and personal— 
 
 






characterized by both threats and deference, by both gaming and appeals to a common  
objective” (Niskanen 1971, 24–25). Within the US government, each government agency 
is appropriated a yearly budget by Congress, or politicians. This results in budgets that 
are politically motivated because of the interplay between Congress, the voters, and 
interest groups; bureaucracies seek to convince legislators that their budget should be 
protected or increased (Simmons 2011, 78) (see figure 1). 
As it did during the Cold War, today the CIA faces a unique situation. Its direct 
customer is the president, but Congress controls its budget. The CIA must find a way to 
fulfill the directions of the president and ensure those actions are justifiable to Congress. 
Richard Helms was Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) from 1966 to 1973. He 
recounts a conversation in early 1954 with former DCI Allen Dulles, who was also the 
longest-serving DCI (1953–1961), about the importance of covert operations. Helms had 
always assumed that the low cost of intelligence work was a bonus. Dulles changed his 
perspective when he said, 
We have to face the fact that because espionage is relatively cheap it will 
probably always seem inconsequential to some of our less informed 
friends on the Hill—in both houses of Congress. They’re accustomed to 
dealing in billions. What kind of impression can it make when I come 
along and ask for a few hundred thousand dollars and a bag of pennies? 
Believe me, I know the way they think up there. If there’s no real money 
involved, it can’t be important, and they just won’t pay much attention to 
us. (Helms and Hood 2004, 105) 
 
In addition to the core motivation of utility-maximization, bureaucracies also seek 
to maximize the amount of autonomy they possess by competing to maintain control over 
their specific policy area and responsibilities (Kunioka and Rothenberg 1993; Wilson 
1989; Ellison 1995). Autonomy for a bureaucracy means that it is able to control how its 





Bureaucracies may also seek to maximize their power and in turn their influence in order 
to ensure their survival as an organization (Rourke 1973). Created by the National 
Security Act of 1947, the CIA faced significant bureaucratic opposition from the 
Department of Defense and the FBI. The CIA was 
a bureaucratic compromise . . . [and] limited by bureaucratic jealousies 
and “Gestapo” fears. Perhaps one of the biggest concerns for the CIA was 
the FBI. The FBI–CIA relationship, from the beginning, was hindered by 
cultural differences, rivalries, security concerns, legal separation, and 
jurisdictional “twilight zones.” By law, the two now had very different 
goals, requiring different strategies and ways of thinking. (Hitz and Weiss 
2004, 4)  
 
J. Edgar Hoover was notorious for his dislike of sharing information and cooperating 
with other agencies, and he remained director of the FBI until his death in 1972 (L. K. 
Johnson 2007, 249). Over time there was more collaboration between the CIA and the 
FBI, but it took decades to overcome the suspicion, hostility, and resistance. “Resistance 
was so strong that insiders in both agencies referred to the FBI/CIA swaps as the ‘hostage 
exchange program’”(Zegart 2007, 58). While the hostility might have faded, blockades to 
interagency cooperation remained throughout the twentieth century, with the 9/11 
Commission finding at least eleven missed operational opportunities when, if information 
had been shared, 9/11 might have turned out differently (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004).  
In 1968, the CIA was barely over twenty years old. This put extra pressure on its 
ability to justify its budget and existence and, as noted above, find reasons to increase its 
power in order to better survive. As with the application of the CIA’s culture to regime 
change operations, examining CIA’s actions through public choice theory has not been 





on specific events and operations. This thesis seeks to discover if public choice theory 
can explain events within the national security sphere. Public choice theory would argue 
that a bureaucracy such as the CIA would actively seek to protect its budget, ensure its 
survival, and maximize its autonomy and power by responding to the priorities of those 
with political and budgetary oversight—the president and Congress—who themselves are 
responding to the attitudes and interests of the American people 
HYPOTHESES  
 
As shown in the literature review, system-level analyses like realism/neorealism 
and neoliberal institutionalism fail to adequately explain the divergence in US actions 
toward Chile and Peru; the literature on state-level theories, specifically strategic culture 
and public choice, provides potential alternative explanations for US actions. As noted 
earlier, in order to examine the merits of these competing explanatory paradigms two 
hypotheses will be examined: 
Hypothesis A—founded in Organizational Culture: Pronounced cultural attributes 
internal to CIA contributed in a significant way to CIA thinking and decision-making 
regarding regime change and tipped the scales in favor of regime change in the case of 
Chile and against regime change in Peru. 
Hypothesis B—founded in Public Choice Theory: Exogenous pressures from the 
American public and American elected officials were the primary determinants in the 
focus of CIA attention, analysis, and action in the case of pursuing regime change in 
Chile and inaction in Peru.  
Process tracing will be used to evaluate whether endogenous influences, 





components of CIA culture, or the exogenous pressures identified in public choice theory 
better explain the divergence in US decision-making regarding regime change in Peru 
and Chile. In examining strategic culture and the CIA’s organizational culture, the wider 
literature has been narrowed to these four cultural variables: 
1. The CIA values secrecy 
2. The CIA values operations over analysis 
3. The CIA values the number of production pieces over their quality 
4. The CIA seeks for consistency across its analytical line 
Given the consistency with which these variables surfaced across the literature and the 
stature of the scholars advocating them, we would expect to see one or more of them play 
a significant role in determining such high-profile action as when to pursue regime 
change.  
Public choice theory identifies several variables that would be present if 
exogenous pressures were responsible for the divergence in action toward Peru and Chile. 
The CIA acts to: 
1. Protect its budget,  
2. Ensure its survival, and 
3. Maximize its autonomy and power. 
In the subsequent sections, the summary of the evidence and the resulting findings will be 
presented, followed by a more detailed accounting of the methodology and the steps 
taken throughout the research. The methodology section will also describe how the case 
studies will be presented in the subsequent sections. The remaining sections will focus on 






SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS: 
The results of the thesis research show that the CIA’s organizational culture, to 
the extent that it has been currently captured by scholars, fails to explain the divergence 
in US regime change pursuits:  
1. The valuing of secrecy, while present, played little role in determining the 
CIA course of action in the two cases under consideration. Secrecy was 
present in collecting information regarding both cases and in communicating 
that information but did not play a role in determining the diverse outcomes. It 
registers as a somewhat neutral “non-factor.” 
2. Internal documents from the CIA do not reveal an overt push for operations in 
either Chile or Peru. If anything, many of these analytical documents reveal a 
reserve toward action and uncertainty in the right course of action.  
3. The value the CIA placed on production of analytical pieces over quality is 
evident across the process tracing conducted for this thesis but played the role 
of catering to policymakers who were themselves concerned more about Chile 
than Peru. The number of CIA internal memos and products track with 
external attention on Chile and Peru within the American public media. 
Again, commensurate with policymaker interest, the CIA’s assessments of 
Chile are not only greater in number; they are also of higher quality than those 
conducted on Peru. 
4. The CIA desire for consistency does not seem strikingly evident across the 
intelligence produced on Chile and Peru. The CIA shifted its analytic line and 





in Peru. Peru was the subject of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) only 
three times, all of which echoed the same analysis of Peru being anti-
communist and experiencing a short-term intensification of nationalistic, anti-
US sentiments.  
In contrast, the test for public choice theory shows strong promise as a powerful 
explanatory tool for the divergence in US actions towards Peru and Chile: 
1. We would expect CIA priorities to track with policymaker priorities in order to 
win favor and a bigger budget. Through analysis of external pressures, CIA 
efforts matched what the public’s, the president’s, and Congress’s attention was 
focused on—Chile and not Peru. 
2. This case would be strengthened if policymaker priorities were out of step with 
actual security realities—the mission the CIA is meant to serve! As will be 
demonstrated in the following sections, Peru was every bit as much a worry as 
Chile, and unlike Chile it was not balanced with democratic institutions and a 
watchful military. Like Chile, Peru was nationalizing many key industries and 
reducing US influence, which was an economic threat to the US. Peru was also 
leading the way in restoring Latin American ties with Cuba and Fidel Castro. Peru 
also was more in the Soviet sphere of influence, with closer military and 
economic ties than Chile. Other than a stated Marxist ideology, Allende made 
fewer and slower moves towards a close relationship with the USSR. The CIA 
should have analyzed it equally—invested just as much time and as many 
resources to understanding it and warning about it—but it did not. Peru did not 





having equally strong Soviet ties. Using this metric, policymaker interest appears 
out of step with security realities, a situation the CIA did not attempt to remedy—
despite its role as the president’s premier intelligence agency. 
METHODOLOGY 
 
As briefly discussed earlier, process tracing will be used to evaluate whether 
endogenous influences, specifically the cultural variables currently identified within the 
literature as key components of CIA culture, or the exogenous pressures identified in 
public choice theory explains the divergence in US decision-making regarding regime 
change in Peru and Chile. Process tracing was deemed the best fit for this research as the 
focus is on causal inferences and is well-suited for case studies. As this is a new area of 
research, it is necessary to identify and clearly show the presence of the causal 
mechanism before the findings can later be generalized and applied to other CIA covert 
operations that attempt to influence regime change in a foreign state. 
Process tracing is an analytic tool that draws descriptive and causal inferences 
from evidence gathered and analyzes events or situations as they unfold over time 
(Collier 2011, 824). In this case, I am specifically using a type of process tracing for 
theory testing, focusing “on the systematic study of the link between an outcome of 
interest and an explanation based on the rigorous assessing and weighting of evidence for 
and against causal inference” (Ricks and Liu 2018, 842). I will engage in process tracing 
to the degree that it is possible to illuminate the thinking, decision-making, and actions of 
the CIA through the written documents available in the public space. The process tracing 
occurs through the chronological examination of the events in the two case studies, Peru 





To follow the chain of events, I will draw from a variety of sources as some 
documents remain classified. Primary and secondary sources include the following: 
government studies commissioned by the National Security Council on Chile, Peru, 
communism, and Latin America; the reports from the Rockefeller Commission, House 
Pike Committee, and Senate Church Committee, which were all formed to investigate 
allegations of misconduct by the CIA and other members of the intelligence community; 
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on Chile, Peru, and related subjects, which are the 
official comments of the CIA on the pertinent subject; the memoirs of Richard D. Helms 
and William Colby, former CIA directors during the time period studied; and a collection 
of memos, telecon transcripts, cables, and other pertinent government documents about 
the events in Chile and Peru from the 1960s through 1975 and the release of the Church 
Report. In addition, data on the prevalence of Chile, Peru, and associated topics in the 
media, Congressional hearings, and government documents was collected and analyzed. 
An examination of over one hundred government documents, memoirs, intelligence 
products, and news articles shed light on the source of key influences—internal culture or 
external pressure—to pursue regime change in Chile and not in Peru. 
In the documentation which follows, I will demonstrate that the CIA overrode 
some of its most pronounced cultural preferences, as delineated by the scholars who 
study its internal culture, in favor of pursuing analysis and action that met the 
expectations of the president, Congress, and the public. Using Occam’s Razor, or the idea 
that the simplest explanation is preferred, the evidence uncovered by this thesis, most 
particularly the NIEs produced by the CIA itself, swings heavily in favor of public choice 





The process tracing presented here will occur in three distinct stages. The first 
will be a detailed look at Peru and the second at Chile. These two cases studies will be 
organized in a similar fashion. For each of these two cases studies, a brief background 
will be provided of the country’s history and relationship with the United States. A 
timeline of key events in the time period of interest will also be included. The chain of 
events in each country will be detailed in sections organized by the National Intelligence 
Estimates (NIEs) dealing with Chile and Peru. NIEs “are the [Intelligence Community’s] 
authoritative written judgments on national security issues. NIEs usually provide 
information on the likely course of future events and highlight the implications for U.S. 
policymakers” (Rosenbach and Peritz 2009, 36). As the premier CIA product and because 
NIEs represent the collective opinion of the CIA, they were used to trace beliefs of the 
CIA throughout the time period studied and as a method of analyzing the CIA’s response 
to exogenous stimuli. Throughout each case study, CIA cultural variables and possible 
external pressures will be analyzed if they appear to be present. The last stage of process 
tracing will be an analysis of the difference in the two cases, the attention the media 
placed on Peru and Chile, and the attention placed on Peru and Chile by the president and 




 A former colony, Peru gained its independence from Spain in 1824. In the 
nineteenth century there were several wars and altercations over border disputes, during 





took decades to resolve, and by the late 1960s there was still some tension between the 
countries. The leaders of Peru alternated between military leaders and elected presidents 
and with civil wars, coups, and, more than once, several individuals claiming the right to  
 
 
be president at the same time. Most coups were by members of the military, in some 
cases the coup’s purpose was to retake leadership and reestablish elections, whereupon 
the coup leader stepped down. Or the presidents were elected by virtue of being the only 
one allowed on the ballot. The military showed a propensity for involving itself in the 
political processes of Peru. Of the ten governments from 1948 to 1980, seven of them 
were led by military leaders. Nineteen of those thirty-two years were spent under a 
military dictatorship. Since a return to elections in 1980, there has been only one short-
lived coup, in the early nineties when the president of Peru dissolved the Peruvian 
Congress for a little under one year.   
 Overall, the US relationship with Peru was friendly, even if it was not seen as one 
of the more important Latin American countries. However, the 1960s saw a rising of anti-
American and anti-imperialist feelings across all of Latin America, in part due to the 
Presidents of Peru from 1945 to 1980 
 President Background Method of Gaining Office 
1945–1948 José Luis Bustamente y 
Rivero 
 Elections 
1948–1950 Manuel A. Odría Amoretti  Coup 
1950 Zenon NIruega Agüero Military Interim leader 
1950–1956 Manuel A. Odría Amoretti Military Elections (only candidate) 
1956–1962 Manuel Prado y Ugarteche  Elections 
1962–1963 Ricardo Pérez Godoy Military Coup 
1963 Nicolas Lindley Lopez Military Coup 
1963–1968 Fernando Belaúnde Terry  Elections 
1968–1975 Juan Velasco Alvarado Military Coup 
1975–1980 Francisco Morales Bermudez Military Coup 








dislike of US interventions, both 
perceived and factual. An ongoing 
controversy centered on fishing 
rights. This concern was also 
shared by several other countries 
throughout South America. The 
fishing industry is one of the largest 
industries in Peru. The US followed 
the twelve-mile rule, believing that 
a country’s territorial rights only 
extended twelve miles into the 
ocean and past that anyone was 
allowed to fish. The Peruvian 
government believed that its 
territory extended 200 miles into 
the ocean. Throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s Peru occasionally seized 
US vessels operating in violation of 
the twelve-mile limit with an ebb 




1963 Fernando Belaunde Terry wins 
the presidential election. 
1968 
October 3 
Military junta led by Juan Velasco 
Alvarado forces Belaunde’s 
resignation. 
October 9  
The Peruvian government 




A Peruvian gunboat fires on a US 
fishing vessel. 
June 24 
Agrarian Law (reform measure) 
August 22 
Seizure of the W. R. Grace and 
Co. sugar plantation, which 
belonged to one of the largest US 
interests in Peru. 
1970 
April 14 
Mining Law (reform measure) 
May  
Peruvian Earthquake 
July 30  
Industrial Law (reform measure) 
1974    
February 
A deal is finally reached on the 
IPC controversy 
1975  
August 29    
A new junta forms headed by 








THE 1964 PERUVIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 
A NIE was produced in 1963 titled “Political Prospects in Peru,” referred to from 
here on out as 97-63 (the country/subject code and the year published). NIEs “are the 
[Intelligence Community’s] authoritative written judgments on national security issues. 
NIEs usually provide information on the likely course of future events and highlight the 
implications for U.S. policymakers” (Rosenbach and Peritz 2009, 36). The 1963 NIE and 
the others used throughout this thesis give insight into the CIA’s judgements on the 
situations in Peru and Chile. This was a time of uncertainty in Peru, as a military junta 
had once again intervened in Peruvian politics in 1962. This time it was to prevent 
APRA, a radical leftist but anti-communist group, from gaining power after the 1963 
presidential and congressional elections. The overarching conclusion of the CIA and 
other intelligence professionals contributing to the NIE was that  
Peru’s present political difficulties are the result of pressures for political 
and social change generated in a long static society undergoing 
industrialization and urbanization. These pressures have been building up 
for a generation. A resolution of the consequent political tensions is not 
likely to be accomplished for many years. (“Political Prospects in Peru” 
1963, 1) 
 
The CIA was aware of the tensions in Peruvian society and that it would be hard to 
predict short- and long-term outcomes. In addition, it acknowledged that the military had 
sufficient power and capabilities to intervene again if the election in June 1963 saw any 
chance of APRA gaining power. The NIE also noted that communist and/or pro-Castro 
groups were not anticipated to achieve any power in the future and the military would be 
able to control any efforts to do so. A noteworthy conclusion in light of future events was 
its prediction of future radical leadership (or any government that was significantly 





In the past, Peruvian Governments have been unwilling to make the 
sacrifices or to risk the political liabilities of programs aimed at bringing 
about fundamental social and economic change. Now, however, Peru faces 
a situation in which political stability is becoming more and more 
dependent on the ability and disposition of governments to respond 
effectively to popular demands for economic well-being and security. This 
situation augurs a breakup of the existing structure of the Peruvian 
society and economy. Unless the forces of moderation are able to 
bring about orderly change, radical leadership will probably get the 
chance to try its methods. (“Political Prospects in Peru” 1963, 2; 
emphasis added)  
 
Fernando Belaúnde Terry was elected president of Peru after the 1963 elections. He was 
expected to pursue numerous reforms in an attempt to respond to the demands of the 
public for, as stated in the NIE, “economic well-being and security.” 
 
PERU POST-COUP 
The next NIE regarding Peru was not produced until 1969; however, several 
important developments Peruvian society and in the US-Peru relationship occurred 
during this time. Over a seven-month period in 1965 there was a communist-led guerilla 
insurgency with several different groups contributing, including the National Liberation 
Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR). The extent of US support is a 
matter of debate as President Belaúnde and the US Ambassador to Peru J. Wesley Jones 
denied the involvement of US military advisors and publicly stated that US aid was 
limited to communication equipment, helicopters, and planes (Walter 2010, 73-74). 
Contradicting the public statements are accounts from former CIA official Victor 
Marchetti, former State Department intelligence analyst John D. Marks, and former CIA 
agent Philip Agee that described the involvement of Green Berets and CIA personnel as 
military advisors and the construction of a “miniature Fort Bragg,” with the CIA also 





of the insurgency, the US embassy in Peru concluded that once the guerilla insurgency 
was put down the Communist threat to Peru was ended (Furlong, 2021). 
During the latter half of the 1960s and into the 1970s, the US-Peruvian 
relationship was centered on the IPC controversy. In Peru, the state is the only one that 
can own land, though exceptions exist. Such was the case for what became the La Brea y 
Parinas oil field. The International Petroleum Company (IPC), a subsidiary of Standard 
Oil of New Jersey, acquired it in 1924 and inherited the long-standing dispute. There 
were numerous attempts to resolve the issue through the years. In 1968, Peruvian 
president Belaúnde Terry reopened negotiations. At this point in time, Belaúnde was also 
facing an economic crisis, as many of the reforms he had attempted since his election in 
1963 were not bearing fruit, leading to a displeased country. Adding fuel to the fire, 
during the negotiations a key page of a contract that promised to resolve the IPC dispute 
disappeared, throwing the country into an uproar. In October 1968, General Juan Velasco 
Alvarado led a military coup and formed a new government. Almost immediately he 
moved to expropriate all of IPC’s Peruvian assets. The US was then faced with a tricky 
situation. The Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistant Act of 1962 stated that 
if a foreign country expropriates a US company without compensation, then the president 
is to cut off foreign aid to that country. The Peruvian government acknowledged that IPC 
had a right to compensation, but it believed that IPC owed a debt to the Peruvian 
government and wanted the company to pay it first. 
 The NIE was produced in March of 1969, “Peru and the US: The Implications of 
the IPC Controversy” (97-9), about six months after the coup led by General Velasco. 





to give the administration background information. While much of the NIE was regarding 
the ongoing IPC controversy, it also provided several insights into the new military-led 
government. The IPC controversy, as discussed earlier, was one of the causes of tension 
in the US-Peru relationship. This new NIE concluded: 
Because the issue is now caught up in highly emotional nationalism, the 
military regime in Peru will almost certainly not meet the requirements of 
US law for compensation of the IPC for its expropriated assets. Thus, if all 
the forces now in train continue, the crisis with Peru over the IPC will be a 
major one—perhaps disastrous for Peru and for US-Peruvian relations. 
(“Peru and the US” 1969, 1-2) 
 
This NIE warned that if US legislation was followed, there would be more anti-US 
sentiments in Peru. “This would be especially true if President Velasco remains in office 
(as we believe likely). . . . Under Velasco, Peruvians’ reactions might come to include 
expropriations of other US businesses and even a break in diplomatic relations” (“Peru 
and the US” 1969, 2). Even in the beginning stage, the CIA didn’t see signs that the new 
government would be short-term, as comparable Peruvian military takeovers had been. It 
added the caveat that “no one could hold office in Peru’s present and prospective climate 
who appeared to give way on the IPC issue or failed to assert strong independence of US 
influence.” (“Peru and the US” 1969, 3). 
 The NIE found that President Velasco’s cabinet included men from the extreme 
right and left and that he wasn’t influenced by one side more than the other. In fact, the 
CIA had evidence that 
Velasco does not have the loyalty of all his cabinet ministers, particularly 
insofar as his extreme views on the IPC issue that threaten Peru’s 
economic development as well as its relationship with the US. Motivations 
of those who dissent. . .dissent include personal ambition, general concern 
for the Peruvian economy, doubts about Velasco’s ability and his tack, and 
conservative views on communism and extremism generally. (“Peru and 






This cross-section of Velasco’s cabinet reveals the differing views across Peruvian 
society at the time. One common idea was the sense of nationalism and growing anti-US 
feeling. In fact, the CIA characterized Peruvian diplomatic and economic relations with 
the USSR as a “show of independence from the US [rather] than a serious intention to 
develop a firm and close relationship,” particularly as the move to establish those 
relations had begun under president Belaúnde (“Peru and the US” 1969, 3). The warning 
in the NIE was that any action the US took regarding the IPC controversy would cause 
hostile reactions throughout Latin American.  
The danger is not so much that other governments will officially join with 
Peru in condemning US policy, by such means as votes in the 
Organization of American States, as that they will be stimulated to a 
general sharpening of resentments they already feel, especially in the 
sphere of economic relationship. Over time, a number of countries will 
probably try harder to broaden their foreign economic and cultural 
relations as a protection against dependence upon the US—and they care 
much less about how the US views the propriety of these new 
relationships. (“Peru and the US” 1969, 4) 
 
It is clear in this statement that the CIA did not view censure from the OAS as a 
significant danger to the US. It was more concerned with the spreading of anti-US 
sentiment and actions that would be taken by other Latin American states. This would be 
the first time US sanctions were enacted against a friendly Latin American state. In 
addition, the NIE warned that “it is now conventional for most of them to describe as an 
intervention any action by a foreign power which affects the internal political, social, and 
economic development of a country” (“Peru and the US” 1969, 26). The focus here was 
not on any specific leftist policy but the general attitude illustrated by Peru; however, the 
analysis did not offer any forecast on countries that might also veer more leftist if 





 The CIA saw no risk from communism, regardless of diplomatic relations with 
the USSR. Peru established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and signed a trade 
agreement in early 1969, before the NIE was produced. The Peruvian Communist parties 
were characterized in the NIEs as weak in leadership and organization. While many in 
the regime were assessed as reformist, the NIE described Peru’s leadership as having 
“uniformly anti-communist backgrounds. A number are even concerned that the regime 
moved too quickly to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union” (“Peru and 
the US” 1969). There was also no apparent danger from communism within Peruvian 
society:  
In Peruvian society as a whole, extreme leftist ideology – whether 
specifically Communist or generally Marxist –  has never had effective 
appeal. APRA, the strongest party and the one with the widest popular 
base, has been anti-communist for years; it controls most of the labor 
union. . . But what appears to give leftists influence with Velasco is their 
ultranationalism rather than any loyalty to a foreign ideology or interest. 
We have no evidence that their influence on Velasco is different from or 
greater than that or other ultra-nationalist radicals all along the spectrum. 
(“Peru and the US” 1969, 15)  
 
The CIA believed that Peru was experiencing “nationalistic blustering” and that when it 
had run its course Peru would not quickly embrace communist countries to fill the 
economic void left by lost US aid and investment. Aside from the historical non-support 
for communism, the CIA did not provide any further analysis of why it believed Peru was 
making a lot of noise but would not change anything long term. The previous NIE in 
1963 had warned of the deteriorating situation in Peru and the likely breakup of the 
Peruvian society and economy. 
 It is clear from NIE 97-63 and NIE 97-69 that the CIA did not consider there to be 





relations were established with the USSR, they would not be influential. However, as 
elaborated on earlier, the relationship with the USSR, especially the military one, did 
develop to the point where, in the western hemisphere, only Cuba had a closer 
relationship with the USSR (Blasier 1987, 43). 
 Absent from the NIE was any discussion of the expropriation of IPC holdings in 
Peru after the October 1968 coup or the coastal-fishing-rights issue, during which a 
Peruvian vessel fired on a US fishing boat only one month before the NIE was released 
(The New York Times 1969).  
 
PRESIDENT VELASCO’S FIRST YEAR 
At the end of 1969, the CIA produced another NIE, “The Prospects for Peru” (97-
1-69). Between the first 1969 NIE and the second, there were several developments in 
Peru, including the passing of the first major reform measure focused on agrarian reforms 
and the seizure in August of the W. R. Grace and Company’s sugar plantation, which 
belonged to one of the largest US interests in Peru (Lowenthal 1974, 806; Olson 1975, 
411). Henry Kissinger, national security advisor for President Nixon at the time the NIE 
was released, summed up its conclusions: “The military is likely to retain political control 
of Peru for at least several years. There is no effective opposition and none is likely to 
develop in the next year or so” (Kissinger to Nixon, memo, January 8, 1970, CIA FOIA 
Electronic Reading Room). This NIE echoed themes from the earlier 1969 NIE that the 
Peruvians likely would not develop too strong of a relationship with the USSR. In 
addition, the NIE warned that strong nationalism would continue and was a potential 





the regime will remain extremely sensitive to US actions, both private and 
official. If the military come to believe that US actions or policies threaten 
the ultimate success of their program, they will almost certainly harden 
their attitudes toward US interests in Peru and elsewhere. In these 
circumstances, the regime might become much more radical than we now 
anticipate and might seek to establish closer relations with communist 
countries than we now think likely. (National Intelligence Estimate on 
Peru 1970, 2-3) 
 
This NIE did allow that if the US was too harsh or threatened the government’s 
success, then it might drive the Peruvians closer to communism than was then 
possible. 
 What is most interesting is that after this, there were no more NIEs produced 
about Peru until the late 1970s, when it returned to civilian rule. This is despite a 
deepening of Peru’s relationship with the Soviet Union. On August 25, 1970, the Soviet 
deputy prime minister for foreign trade and Ambassador Pérez de Cueller signed an 
agreement that provided Peru “with a $30 million credit to purchase Soviet equipment at 
a low rate of interest and with the option to pay the ten-year loan off at least in part 
through the importation of manufactured goods” (Walter 2010, 234–35). The following 
year, in 1971, Peru signed an “economic-technological agreement with Moscow and 
requested Soviet support for an irrigation project in the Olmos desert” (Brands 2010, 
482). In December 1973, there were leaks that Peru planned to buy two dozen Soviet 
tanks (Brands 2010, 484). In 1974, Aeroflot, the state-owned Soviet airline, began its first 
commercial air service to South America with a flight to Lima (Blasier 1987, 42). In fact, 
it was not until February 1974 that the IPC controversy was settled. Peru would pay $150 
million to the US government, which in turn would distribute it to the expropriated firms 





would organize $150 million in private loans to Peru and would not block loans from the 
Inter-American Development Bank (Brands 2010, 485).  
 Across the time horizon considered and the intelligence products available, there 
is little evidence supporting the hypothesis regarding the CIA’s organizational culture, 
which states: 
Hypothesis A—founded in Organizational Culture: Pronounced cultural 
attributes internal to CIA contributed in a significant way to CIA thinking and 
decision-making regarding regime change and tipped the scales in favor of regime 
change in the case of Chile and against regime change in Peru. 
The variables of secrecy, operations over analysis, and quantity over quality do not 
appear to be present in the NIEs. There is no evidence of any operations in Peru and with 
only three NIEs between 1963 and the late 1970s, there was no push for a high volume of 
regularly produced analyses. The one cultural variable that did appear to play a role was 
consistency across the CIA’s analytical line. The 1963 NIE stated that Peru was anti-
communist, and the first NIE in 1969 stated that Peru was unlikely to deepen its 
relationship with the USSR. It is possible that this accounts for the lack of further 
analytical products on Peru. From the NIEs it is unclear if there is support for Hypothesis 
B, that exogenous pressures determined the focus of CIA attention, analysis, and action 
with regards to Chile and Peru.  
CHILE 
 
 Compared to Peru, Chile had a long history of stable democratic government. 
There had only been two disruptions to peaceful handovers of presidential power since 





1973 coup had been from 1924 to 1932. As in many other countries, the communist and 
socialist political parties in Chile had developed in the 1920s. However, Chile was 
viewed as a leader among the Latin American countries, with economic stability and a 
strong middle class.  
The election of 1958 caught the US by surprise, however, when Salvador 
Allende’s coalition of communist and socialist parties almost won. Running as the 
candidate from the Popular Action Front (FRAP), Allende united all four of the 
Marxist/communist/socialist parties behind one candidate for the first time. At some point 
during the next six years before the next election, the US, through the CIA, began to 
establish a framework for affecting the Chilean elections.  
 
THE 1964 CHILEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
The CIA produced a NIE, “Chilean Situation and Prospects,” a year before the 
1964 Chilean presidential election. The strong showing of Salvador Allende in the 1958 
election had caught it off guard, and the administration was more concerned this time 
around. The NIE reiterated the common acknowledgement that “Chile has a longstanding 
tradition of respect for constitutional order and civil liberties. It has accomplished a 
considerable political evolution by electoral means” (“The Chilean Situation and 
Prospects” 1963, 1). It countered this with the fact that “for half the population real 
wages have been declining since 1950, and a large portion of the population is ill-housed, 
ill-clothed, and ill-fed. Consequently, increasing popular dissatisfaction has been 
expressed in a steadily leftward trend” (“The Chilean Situation and Prospects” 1963, 1). 
The NIE makes mention of the fact that there were very real concerns that the 1964 





 trend was benefiting FRAP, Frente de 
Acción Popular, or Popular Action 
Front. The left-center Christian 
Democratic Party grew thanks to 
reformists who dislike the communist-
aligned FRAP (“The Chilean Situation 
and Prospects” 1963, 1). In fact, it was 
the Christian Democratic Party that 
received help from the CIA through 
funds and other political actions. 
Despite these encouraging signs, the 
CIA stated that it could not predict 
with certainty the outcome of the 
election due to the fluidity of the 
situation. It did predict that even if the 
Communist and Socialist FRAP did 
not win there would not be violence. 
“The Communists would prefer to 
preserve their present legal status and 
bide their time, trusting that 
conservative political influences will 
continue to prevent effective social 
reform and that the cumulative 
Chile 
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The US begins its covert operation 
to prevent Allende from winning 
the presidential election. 
September 4 
Allende wins a plurality in the 
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A military coup led by General 
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frustrations and resentments of the masses will eventually bring them to power” (“The 
Chilean Situation and Prospects” 1963, 2). The Communist Party had been outlawed in 
Chile for many years. 
 In the run-up to the 1964 election, the CIA’s covert operations included funding 
Frei’s party, planting articles in El Mercurio, and other similar propaganda-focused 
efforts aimed at ensuring the candidate most favored by the US would win (“Covert 
Action in Chile” 1975, 15–17). CIA and US fears of an Allende win did not happen. 
Eduardo Frei won, and CIA efforts within Chile dwindled. 
 
LEAD UP TO THE 1970 CHILEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
With the 1970 Chilean presidential election approaching, another NIE was 
produced in January 1969, “Chile” (94-69). At this stage, the candidates for each party or 
alliance had not been determined. The congressional elections happening in 1969 would 
help determine that. The NIE gave a background on how Frei’s presidency had gone, the 
current economic and political forecast, and likely political situations to occur. President 
Frei had carried out many social, economic, and political reforms during his presidency. 
However, he hadn’t reached all of his goals, and the CIA noted that factions within his 
party, the PDC, were pushing for more reforms and a faster pace. In the middle of all this, 
the CIA reported that “economic prospects for the short run are bleak . . . [and] the Frei 
administration is already caught in a quandary of economic stagnation with rapid 
inflation” (“Chile” 1969). In hindsight, the NIE accurately predicted the 1970 presidential 
race. The NIE stated that  
the current odds are that there will be three major candidates for the 
presidency in 1970, that no one of them will secure a majority, and that the 





Communist, Socialist, and Radical parties could set aside their 
differences to agree on a candidate, he would be a strong contender, 
especially in a three-man race.” (“Chile” 1969; emphasis added) 
 
Even before the candidates were decided, with the current economic, social, and political 
atmosphere, the CIA warned that the extreme left could coalesce around a strong 
candidate and that it was possible he could win. Despite this, the NIE continued its 
assurance that even with an administration with Communist support, the CIA believed 
that “for a variety of reasons, including fear of a reaction from the military, such an 
administration would be deterred from precipitate or drastic action” regarding relations 
with the US and the USSR. Those reasons included: 
a. An awareness of the strength of nationalist sentiment in the population 
generally, in the Congress, and in their own parties—a nationalism 
likely to be as strongly against subordinating Chile to the tutelage of 
Moscow (or Havana) as it had been against anything it considered 
subordination to Washington; 
b. A realization that they needed to have and retain the support of 
political elements other than those that elected them if their 
administration was to be at all effective—especially since counsels 
would probably be divided in their own ranks on some aspects of both 
foreign and domestic policy; 
c. A concern that if their administration tried to move too far and too fast, 
the Chilean security forces would unseat it; 
d. An apprehension (and one which Moscow probably shared) that 
anything approaching a full embrace of communism in Chile would 
precipitate action on the part of Argentina, Peru, the US, and other 
countries—perhaps action in support of a takeover by the Chilean 
military, perhaps even direct military intervention. (“Chile” 1969) 
 
Expanding on fear of the military keeping communists in check, the NIE stated that the 
Chilean military was historically antagonistic towards Communists, Socialists, and other 
extreme leftists. However, the NIE did state that the military in Chile was historically 
apolitical.  
Rather than intervene at once to keep a Communist-supported 





probably maintain a constant surveillance over it, particularly if it were led 
by Salvador Allende, and would plan to move against it only if they were 
convinced that Chilean institutions, especially their own, were threatened. 
(“Chile” 1969) 
 
The NIE also predicted that no matter which candidate won, nationalization or 
expropriation of US copper companies should be expected. The manner, terms, and 
timetable would of course depend on the specific administration. Any new administration 
was predicted to be less cooperative, take a more anti-US stance and “explore closer ties 
with Communist countries” (“Chile” 1969). 
An important counterpoint to what could be considered an alarmist trend in the 
CIA’s analyses was the rebuttal to NIE 94-69 that the ambassador to Chile, Edward 
Korry, widely disseminated. He described why he took this step: 
I am taking the unusual action of commenting on it in some detail because 
of the distorted view it could provide of the results of the nationwide 
Congressional elections in a week’s time and because, frankly, I am 
dismayed by the lack of attention to words and their significance. Or 
perhaps the words were chosen to make some kind of case which is even 
worse since then all scholarliness is negated. (American Embassy Santiago 
to Department of State, Memo, February 22, 1969, CIA FOIA Electronic 
Reading Room) 
 
Ambassador Korry’s central claim was that the situation was not as black or white as the 
NIE appeared to present it and that there were positive aspects in the situation. He 
countered the statements that the Chilean economy was not doing well with the fact that  
the stock market of Santiago has just reached the high recorded level ever 
(in constant prices) and the highest volume of transactions in at least five 
years, the culmination of a steady rise during the past six months. 
(Embassy to State) 
 
 Despite fears of an Allende win and the 1969 NIE stating that it was not clear who 
would win the 1970 presidential election, there was not a concerted long-term effort to 





Nixon, who declined to say it was necessary (Helms and Hood 2004, 399). The Church 
Committee report, a special congressional committee formed to investigate alleged illegal 
actions of the US government’s intelligence activities, recounted that on April 17, 1969, 
at a 40 Committee meeting, “it was suggested that something be done, and the CIA 
representative noted that an election operation would not be effective unless it were 
started early. But no action was taken at that time” (‘Covert Action in Chile” 1975, 20). 
The 40 Committee monitored CIA covert action during this time period. It was only in 
March 1970 that the CIA was authorized to spend $125,000 on “spoiling operations”—
essentially just enough money to hopefully cause dissension among the coalition 
supporting Allende; in June, $300,000 was added to the budget and covered posters, 
planted news stories, leaflets, and pamphlets on the dangers of an Allende victory for 
Chilean democracy (Helms and Hood 2004, 400). These efforts were broadly focused on 
anti-Allende messaging, not a directed effort to support one particular candidate as 
before. 
 
THE 1970 CHILEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
The last NIE before the Chilean presidential election was released July 30, just 
over a month before the election on September 4. The 1969 NIE had predicted that the 
race would be too close for there to be a clear winner and that the Chilean Congress 
would end up deciding the victor. The forecast in the 1970 NIE, “The Outlook for Chile,” 
remained inconclusive, even just a month before the election. Out of the three candidates, 
Alessandri, Tomic, and Allende, Congress would choose between the top two. In contrast 
to its earlier tone regarding Allende, this NIE started to take a more extreme stance on 





be “deterred from precipitate or drastic action” (“Chile” 1969). The 1970 NIE a year later 
stated that  
Allende’s socialist state would be a Chilean version of a Soviet style East 
European Communist state, secured with the help of the Chilean 
Communist movement. . . . While we judge that Chilean democracy is 
likely to survive over the next two or three years, it will be tested in the 
near future and with even greater severity over the next decade. The 
greatest threat to stability and constitutional order would come from the 
policies of an Allende administration. Another threat might arise from the 
extra-constitutional reactions of its opponents, including the military. No 
matter who is elected, the tensions in Chilean society are likely to increase 
before they diminish. (“The Outlook for Chile” 1970) 
 
The NIE clearly saw the potential for Allende to threaten US interests and Chilean 
stability. In addition, the fact that the continued neutrality of the Chilean military was 
called into question is important. In October of 1969, there had been mutiny by members 
of the army due to conflict with Frei’s appointees, a decrease in salaries due to inflation, 
and subpar, outdated equipment. The NIE states that “the Chilean Armed Forces . . . have 
a renewed awareness of their potential political power and a greater inclination to use it” 
(“The Outlook for Chile” 1970). It did, however, clarify that it did not believe that the 
Chilean military would repeatedly intervene and become reminiscent of other Latin 
American countries. On the international stage, the CIA believed that “an Allende 
administration would be openly hostile to US interests or at best neutral” (“The Outlook 
for Chile” 1970).   
The final votes were close, meaning that the Chilean Congress would vote for the 
next president, choosing between the two candidates with the most votes. As a matter of 
precedent, the winner of the popular vote was chosen. Allende had received 36.3 percent 





directed the CIA to prevent Allende’s accession to office. These efforts were divided into 
two operations. 
Track I comprised all covert activities approved by the 40 Committee, 
including political, economic and propaganda activities. These activities 
were designed to induce Allende’s opponents in Chile to prevent his 
assumption of power, either through political or military means. Track II 
activities in Chile were undertaken in response to President Nixon’s 
September 15 order and were directed toward actively promoting and 
encouraging the Chilean military to move against Allende. (“Covert 
Action in Chile” 1975, 23) 
 
 The run-off vote in Congress was scheduled for October 22. Central to efforts to 
prevent Allende’s election was the attempt to kidnap Gen. Schneider, who, as leader of 
the army, would prevent a coup to remove Allende from power. Schneider was shot 
during the attempt and died a few days later. The Chilean Congress voted almost 
unanimously for Allende. Allende was inaugurated and almost immediately moved to 
nationalize industries and began implementing other reforms. The US maintained its 
propaganda efforts at this time, largely through El Mercurio (“Covert Action in Chile” 
1975, 29). 
 
CHILE UNDER ALLENDE 
In 1971, another NIE, “The Outlook for Chile Under Allende” (94-71), followed. 
The CIA summarized the Allende Administration with this:  
In the first nine months of his government of Popular Unity, 
President Salvador Allende has moved skillfully and confidently toward 
his declared goal of building a “revolutionary, nationalistic, and socialist 
society on Marxist principles.” His problems are mounting; but he is still 
firmly in control, most of his policies enjoy wide popular support, and his 
ability to manipulate the levers of power is growing. His strategy and 
timetable are impossible to predict in detail. (“The Outlook for Chile 






Despite having been faced with a potential Allende administration since 1963, the CIA 
had not exerted serious effort at forecasting his policies and likely paths. The NIE 
summarized the numerous problems that Chile was facing economically with inflation 
and shortages. The CIA stated that Allende did not have enough political strength to 
make it through the difficulties and that “consolidation of the Marxist political leadership 
in Chile is not inevitable” (“The Outlook for Chile Under Allende” 1971). It is here 
where the CIA began to talk about more drastic options that Allende might take, such as 
replacing Congress or finding a way to avoid the 1973 congressional election. Despite 
having stated the past two years that the Chilean democracy would survive and that 
Allende would not take drastic action, the NIE did not discuss why the earlier reasons the 
CIA gave as to why that wouldn’t happen disappeared.  
Though [Allende] would almost certainly prefer to adhere to constitutional 
means, he is likely to be impelled to use, and to rationalize, political 
techniques of increasingly dubious legality; eventually he is likely to feel 
it necessary to employ his considerable Presidential powers to change the 
political system so that the UP coalition can perpetuate itself in control. 
The factors operating for and against this outcome are nearly evenly 
balanced; the actual outcome could be dictated by quite fortuitous 
circumstances at some key moment. (“The Outlook for Chile Under 
Allende” 1971) 
 
 This NIE was the first more serious discussion of the Chilean military intervening 
in the government, including leading a coup. While the NIE clearly stated that “the 
Chilean military are not now disposed to political intervention,” it did allow that further 
economic deterioration and “severe social unrest” could lead to military action. It listed 
additional circumstances, such as “a blatantly unconstitutional action by Allende, an 





considered a threat against the armed forces as an institution” (“The Outlook for Chile 
Under Allende” 1971). 
 Contrasting with other messages within the NIE, 94-71 also discussed the pattern 
of Allende’s relationships with Communist or socialist powers, including Cuba. Allende 
did not break ties with any former allies and did not “subordinate Chilean interests. . . . 
The new pattern reflects Allende’s desire to chart an independent nationalist course for 
Chile both within the hemisphere and on the world stage” (“The Outlook for Chile Under 
Allende” 1971). While ties with Communist countries were viewed as being likely to 
continue to increase, it would not necessarily be on the military front.  
Chile is less likely to seek large-scale military aid from the Communists 
partly because the equipment desired by the Chilean Armed Forces is 
obtainable in the West, partly because the military leaders in Chile prefer 
to deal with Western military establishments, and partly 
because Allende sees no advantage in needlessly antagonizing the US in 
such a sensitive matter as Western Hemisphere security. If the USSR were 
to request maintenance facilities for its navy in Chilean 
ports, Allende would probably find it difficult to oppose, given his 
probable need for Soviet economic help. But we doubt that he, or the 
Chilean military establishment, would tolerate a permanent Soviet 
military presence in the country. ((“The Outlook for Chile Under 
Allende” 1971); emphasis added) 
 
The NIE forecasted US-Chilean relations were still likely to continue to deteriorate in 
some manner over the course of Allende’s presidency. The 1971 NIE also raised 
concerns over repercussions throughout Latin America similar to concerns raised about 
Peru. As the 1971 NIE put it, 
Labor, intellectuals and other such groups will look to Chile for 
inspiration. A leftist front on the Chilean model is already organized in 
Uruguay to participate in this fall’s election. It has little chance of 
winning, but if it attracts a substantial minority of the Uruguayan 
electorate, it will encourage the formation of similar fronts elsewhere, e.g., 







TWO YEARS INTO ALLENDE’S PRESIDENCY 
The US continued to watch Chile closely. The NIE produced the following year, 
“Chile: Alternatives Facing the Allende Regime” (94-72), did not offer any new insights 
into the situation, repeating the same concerns over the potential for Allende to stay in 
power and turn Chile into a socialist state. Of note is that there is a segment that dealt 
with the likelihood of Allende being removed from office. The NIE stated that the 
chances of this were fairly small since the military did “not now appear willing to mount 
a coup” (“Chile” 1972). Many of the reasons echo earlier NIEs in that the military 
tradition in Chile was to not become involved in the political process. 
A vital factor in any decision by the military to intervene would be their 
perception of the popular consensus at the time. Among the contingencies 
that would increase the likelihood of action by the military would be a 
blatantly unconstitutional act by Allende, real or threatened breakdown in 




THE END OF ALLENDE’S PRESIDENCY 
 The last NIE (94-73) before the September 11 coup in 1973 was released roughly 
three months earlier on June 14, 1973. The 1973 NIE, “Chile,” continued to lay out 
potential outcomes in Chile. The three likely paths were (1) a political standoff where 
Allende was blocked from any political gains and things remained in limbo for three 
years until the 1976 presidential elections; (2) Allende could manage to consolidate his 
power to the point where there was no serious opposition; or (3) the military could step in 
and repudiate Allende’s government or even remove him from office through a coup. The 
conclusion a mere three months before the coup was that “at this juncture, a political 





repudiation, while less likely than those for standoff, appear roughly equal, one to the 
other” (“Chile” 1973). However, the NIE stated that there was evidence of coup plots 
within the military and a growing sense of urgency within the leadership for some sort of 
action against Allende. In early August, the commander of the army, General Prats, was 
replaced by General Augusto Pinochet. A month later, he orchestrated a coup which 
resulted in the death of President Salvador Allende and a military dictatorship led by 
General Pinochet that lasted until 1990.  
 There are few instances of CIA organizational culture variables surfacing as 
impactful across CIA analysis or operations regarding Chile. Both a value for secrecy and 
a preference for operations over analysis do not appear throughout the CIA’s Chilean 
operations or in the NIEs. It is possible to view the high number of analytic products as 
valuing production over quality, but it is more likely a measured response to keep abreast 
of the situation and anticipate the future. The CIA did not seek for consistency across its 
analytical line, however, with Allende’s election marking a major turning point. The 
1963 and 1969 NIEs were vague about the implications of an Allende presidency. They 
were confident that Chilean democracy would be tested but that it would survive, in part 
due to the watchful eye of the Chilean military. They would not involve themselves with 
policy, but would likely step in if Allende went too far in turning Chile into a socialist 
state. Starting in 1970, however, the NIEs took on a much more foreboding tone. Gone 
were the forecasts that democracy would survive. It was acknowledged as an option, and 
the CIA did state that a Marxist Chile was not inevitable. There was a serious discussion 
on the options the Allende had to turn Chile communist. If the CIA had been consistent, 





type of threat posed by Chile as a potential Marxist state and the threat of Peru as anti-
US, with close Soviet ties; however, there is no common cultural variable that can 
account for their difference in treatment by the CIA. The rest of the thesis will trace 
exogenous pressures from the 1960s and 1970s to test if the difference in policy can be 
better explained by public choice theory.  
EXTERNAL PRESSURES ON THE CIA 
 
The exogenous pressure on the CIA was traced in three steps. First, the attention 
the public was paying to Chile, Peru, and their respective leaders—Allende and Velasco. 
This was done through a careful analysis of news articles whose subject was Peru, Chile, 
Velasco, or Allende. The second step would be to identify if the US government had 
differences in the focus on Peru or Chile that could be linked to the change in the public’s 
attention. This was done through examining Congressional hearings and a database 
search of government documents. The last step would be to take a broader examination of 
the difference in the CIA’s focus between Peru and Chile. 
 
THE PUBLIC 
Public choice theory asserts that the public exerts pressure on the bureaucracy 
through their role as voters or interest groups who influence both the president and 
Congress. Based on the current world situation, the public was concerned with the Soviet 
Union, communism, and the Vietnam War. 
The New York Times has digitized its articles back to 1851. A dataset was 
compiled of all the articles that mention Peru, Chile, Salvador Allende, and Juan Velasco 





throughout my research. Beginning with the year 1960 allows a better view of the 
average attention paid to the selected terms, rapid increases or decreases, incremental 
growth or decline, or any other generalizations. In addition, Peru had presidential 
elections in 1963, allowing a comparison between the Peruvian 1968 coup and the 
elections. Beginning with 1960 also allows for a comparison of the two Chilean 
presidential elections. The latter dates were when both countries had a leftist, anti-
imperialist government ascend to power. Including the earlier dates allows a comparison 
in attention between elections in which the status quo was kept and when leftist 
governments took control. 1976 was chosen as the end date because, for Chile, the 
investigation into the CIA’s actions had ended and the Rockefeller Commission, the 
Senate Church Committee, and the House Pike Committee had all submitted their reports. 
In Peru, President Velasco was ousted due to his ill health and replaced by another 
Peruvian general, Francisco Morales Bermúdez in 1975. By tracking reporting up 
through 1976, we are able to account for a comparison between the two Peruvian military 
coups and the public’s concern with the events to see if the public paid any consistent 
attention to the Peruvian changes in government.  
As seen in figure 5, there was always more public interest in Chile than in Peru. 
There is a distinct downward trend in the number of articles about Peru. The coup at the 
end of 1968 led to many reform measures being implemented in 1969, which likely 
contributed to a slight increase in the number of articles in 1969. In contrast, the number 
of articles concerning Chile were much more varied; however, starting with the lower 
number of articles in 1968 and 1969, the number of articles began an upward trend as 
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per month in the twelve months preceding the September 11, 1973 coup, was 69. The 
month after the coup, saw 213 articles published – an increase of 208.7%. Based on the 
average number of articles, without the coup there still would have been over 800 articles 
which is an increase from the 688 articles about Chile in 1972. This shows that, of the 
two cases, Chile received both a greater amount of external/public visibility and for a 
longer amount of time. This is mirrored in figure 6, with the external visibility of 
Salvador Allende and Juan Velasco Alvarado. While not as drastic a difference as seen 
with the keyword searches “Chile” and “Peru,” there were considerably more articles on 
Allende than on Velasco, with interest peaking in 1973, when he died during the coup, 
and articles slowly declining as the Congressional committees conducted hearings for 
their reports.  
 
THE US GOVERNMENT 
When examining the visibility and concern of each case study within the US 
government, I turned to two main sources—Congressional hearings and the US 
Declassified Documents online database. First, I identified the Congressional hearings 
that concerned themselves with either Peru or Chile in the previously established 
timeframe (1960–1976). There were eight hearings for Peru and thirteen for Chile. Of the 
nine hearings about Peru, three were for ambassador nominations, four were about US 
aid (all within the timeframe 1960–1965), leaving just one that dealt with US relations 
with Peru after the 1968 coup and the seizure of IPC property by the ruling junta. Out of 
Chile’s thirteen hearings, seven of the hearings were about human rights and refugees 
after the 1973 Pinochet coup, and one was regarding an ambassadorial nomination. The 





death. Based on this information of one hearing about the situation in Peru versus five 
about Chile and Allende, Congress was more concerned about Chile than Peru. This 
matches what was found in the data from the New York Times, where the public remained 
interested in Chile and Allende for a more sustained length of time than they did about 
Peru and Velasco. 
 A broader study of the US government’s focus was also important. The U.S. 
Declassified Documents Online collection is compiled of documents from presidential 
libraries and executive agencies, including the Department of State and the Central 
Intelligence Agency. The documents include intelligence studies, policy papers, 
diplomatic correspondence such as cables and memos, and various other types of 
government documents. In addition to using the collection to gather primary source 
material, the database offers the ability to compile search-term-frequency data, including 
the number of documents by year and the percentage of documents in the collection using 
that term. Peru and Chile were used as search terms, with an expanded time frame of 
1950–1976.  
Contrary to expectations, the percentage of documents regarding Peru and Chile 
was about the same until 1970 as seen in figure 7. A common argument is that the 
government was always more concerned with Chile as a stable democracy than Peru; 
however, this finding offers a different perspective that, at least among classified 
documents, the difference between the two countries was negligible. The percentage of 
documents changed with Allende’s election with an increase in documents about Chile 
compared with Peru, and then more drastically in 1973, when documents about Chile 
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 Supporting the claim that Peru and Chile received equal attention within the US 
government for many years is the number of documents as seen in figure 8. It is not until 
1964, the year of Chile’s presidential elections, that the number of documents does not 
follow previous trends. Due to the insurgency that was put down in 1965 and the 
resurgence of the IPC controversy in 1967, Peru sees a general increase in documents, but 
after a high point in 1967, sees a downturn before seeing less than 50 per year from 1970 
onwards. Chile’s highest number of documents is actually from 1964–1967. There could 
be any number of reasons for fewer documents after Allende’s election, including that 
some documents still remain classified. The comparison between the documents for Peru 
and Chile from 1950–1976 does show that from 1964 onwards there was a difference in 
how the government internally approached Peru and Chile. Before, Peru and Chile 
received an equal amount of focus, but after 1964 the majority of the years see more 
documents concerning Chile being produced. The number of Peruvian documents 
increased sharply in 1967, the year that the Peruvian Congress declared that the IPC 
properties belonged to the Peruvian government. After this the number of documents per 
year about Peru decreases again and levels out at a lower number than before. This 
contrasts with documents about Chile, the number of which increases and then stays 
consistently higher than documents about Peru. 
 
THE CIA 
Narrowing the focus of external factors even more, a list of NIEs concerning Peru 
and Chile was compiled. As stated earlier, NIEs “are the [Intelligence Community’s] 
authoritative written judgments on national security issues. NIEs usually provide 





policymakers” (Rosenbach and Peritz 2009, 36).  As the premier analysis product, the 
NIEs indicate which national security issues the CIA was most focused on. At first 
glance, it is clear that more emphasis was placed on Chile, with seven declassified NIEs 




that could have been produced by the CIA, it does indicate that more sustained attention 
was being placed on Chile and being requested.  
The data from the New York Times, Congressional hearings, government 
documents, and NIEs all support Hypothesis B, founded in public choice theory: 
Exogenous pressures from the American public and American elected officials 
were the primary determinants in the focus of CIA attention, analysis, and action 
in the case of pursuing regime change in Chile and inaction in Peru.  
National Intelligence Estimates Concerning Peru and Chile 
 
Chile 
94-63  Chilean Situation and Prospects 
94-69  Chile 
94-70  The Outlook for Chile 
94-71  The Outlook for Chile Under Allende (SNIE)* 
94-72  Chile: Alternatives Facing the Allende Regime 
94-73  Chile 
 
Peru 
97-63  Political Prospects in Peru 
97-69    Peru and the Implications of the IPC Controversy (SNIE)* 
97-1-69 The Prospects for Peru 
 
*SNIE – Special NIE 
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As is evident in the data from the New York Times, the US public had lost interest in Peru 
after the initial coup by President Velasco. This in turn led to more attention being placed 
on Chile and Allende by the president and Congress, evident in the number of documents 
produced and the percentage of US documents concerning Chile. In response to its 
customers’ concerns, the CIA focused more on Chile than on Peru.  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis was intended to be the first step in building a state-level theory of CIA 
involvement in regime change operations. As shown in the literature review, system-level 
analyses like realism and neoliberal institutionalism fail to explain the divergence in US 
actions toward Chile and Peru; the literature on state-level theories, specifically strategic 
culture and public choice, offer reasonable alternative approaches to explain US actions. I 
proposed two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis A—founded in Organizational Culture: Pronounced cultural attributes 
internal to the CIA contributed in a significant way to CIA thinking and decision-making 
regarding regime change and tipped the scales in favor of regime change in the case of 
Chile and against regime change in Peru. 
Hypothesis B—founded in Public Choice Theory: Exogenous pressures from the 
American public and American elected officials were the primary determinants in the 
focus of CIA attention, analysis, and action in the case of pursing regime change in Chile 
and inaction in Peru.  
 Of the two hypotheses, public choice theory offers the most potential as an 
explanatory tool for CIA involvement in regime change. Scholars should be more careful 





factors involved in covert operations. Evidence from this thesis appears to indicate that 
CIA involvement in regime change was the result of public perception and the priorities 
of politicians, not of internal CIA cultural factors. The events in Chile were clearly more 
visible to the public and Congress, in addition to having a sustained visibility. While 
there were spikes in attention to the events in Peru, they were short-lived and interest 
remained small. For this research, I used the NIEs to gauge how much pressure the CIA 
was feeling from the external visibility of the situations. A larger number of documents 
were found on Chile. In addition, there was no mention of Peru in any of the documents 
the Church Committee produced while an entire staff report was dedicated to covert 
actions in Chile. Strongly motivated by survival, increasing organizational power, and 
budget, the CIA prioritized those areas that were visible to its most important customer—
the president—and to the ones who controlled its budget—Congress.  
The answer to the puzzle of why the US paid more attention to the events in Chile 
than Peru is in many pieces. One piece is to examine the events within the context of the 
Cold War. This period of time during the Cold War saw a large shift. In the Soviet Union, 
Khrushchev was ousted in 1964 and replaced by Leonid Brezhnev, who oversaw a period 
of détente with the United States. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I (SALT) began 
in 1969, lasting until 1972. SALT II negotiations began soon after, lasting until 1979. 
Despite this, Soviet defense spending increased during this period. In addition, the Cold 
War had transformed from a bi-polar struggle into a tri-polar standoff. The Sino-Soviet 
Split reached a crisis in 1969, with a seven-month border conflict, which brought the two 
powers to the brink of war. It was during this time that Kissinger and Nixon began 





reversing previous foreign policy with regards to China and Taiwan. These major shifts 
in the status quo of the Cold War required more attention and focus and were the 
principal consideration behind any foreign policy decision. 
As an extension of the Cold War, the Vietnam War was drawing significant 
attention domestically and internationally. In Vietnam, 1968 began with the Tet 
Offensive. Just a short year later, President Nixon announced the gradual withdrawal of 
U.S. troops from Vietnam. Conflict was spread all across the southeast Asian region, 
including Laos and Cambodia. Much of U.S. foreign policy was concerned with 
countering Soviet influence and focused on southeast Asia not South America during the 
time period studied. 
The US relationship with Peru and Chile provides another piece of the puzzle. 
The economic situation, especially concerning the IPC controversy was incredibly 
complex and had started years before. While the expropriation of the IPC and the 
eventual resolution occurred during the time period studied, the scope and focus of the 
study did not include a deeper look at previous events. As an ongoing issue, it is possible 
that public attention was not as interested in Peru. The US also chose to not invoke the 
Hickenlooper amendment, which allowed the US to cut off foreign aid to Peru. This 
action likely kept tensions from continuing to rise.  
In addition to economic issues being less threatening, the US embassy in Peru felt 
that the communist threat in Peru ended when the insurrection in 1965 was put down 
(Furlong, 2021). Furthermore, after the coup the Peruvian military began talking about 
retaking the territory lost to Chile after the War of the Pacific in 1883. The US did not 





declined their request; therefore, the US was not concerned when Peru turned to the 
Soviets to purchase military armaments instead (Furlong, 2021). In short, Peru was 
deemed less of a threat ideologically and economically. 
Perhaps the simplest answer to the puzzle of why the US acted in Chile and not in 
Peru, yet the most comprehensive, is that Salvador Allende was the first Marxist elected 
by a democratic country. Between the Vietnam War, détente, and the Sino-Soviet Split, 
there were major events elsewhere that required attention from the US and the 
implications of an Allende presidency drew more attention than a coup that was less of a 
threat ideologically.  
This thesis focused on the power of public choice theory and organizational 
culture as explanatory tools. While public choice theory proved stronger, it would be 
wrong to discount organizational culture entirely and that is an area where this thesis 
could be expanded upon. Another area for research would be to expand on the analysis of 
the New York Times articles and declassified documents by analyzing the subjects to 
identify trends. These are only two potential avenues for further research within this 
thesis; however, an important next step is to repeat this process with other cases across 
CIA and US history. For instance, there was also a lack of action by the US in Bolivia 
and Ecuador where there were military coups. As an agency that is required to be 
impartial to policy choices, it is important to understand exactly how the CIA responds to 
external pressures in order to be aware of potential biases. As an area that has not yet 
been prevalent in scholarly literature, more research and analysis is vital to understanding 
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